The Joy of Trump
Sunday, September 20, 2009
CTV.ca | 'Hush' over Afghan mission must end: Kenny
In a recent op-ed column in the Ottawa Citizen, Liberal Senator Colin Kenny called Afghanistan Canada's Vietnam.
Kenny, who is also Chairman of the Senate National Defence Security Committee, says his criticism may seem "offensive," but Canadians deserve to know what the government hopes to achieve in Afghanistan before the mission ends in 2011.
~Poppy Farmers
Violence in Afghanistan's volatile south has increased in recent weeks, particularly since a U.S. troop surge and a highly contentious presidential election... the increase in violence makes it clear that Canada's strategy to clear, hold and develop former Taliban strongholds is not working.
"Triple D: defence, diplomacy, development is not working. ...We don't have clear goals in Afghanistan. People are asking in my mail, 'Why doesn't the government tell us what they want to achieve there?'"
Retired Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie responded to Kenny's remarks by saying the increase in violence is in fact a sign that Canadian troops are doing valuable work in Afghanistan.
...the influx of American soldiers has allowed the Canadians to concentrate on a smaller area in their fight against the Taliban. Canada's strategy has been hampered by the fact that NATO failed "to provide the resources necessary to take this thing to a proper conclusion early on."
But Mackenzie said with the American surge and President Barack Obama's renewed focus on combating the Taliban in Afghanistan, the new commander of the International Security Assistance Force, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, will adopt Canada's clear, hold and develop strategy.
I say, there has been No Progress changing the character or mentality of Afghans:
Making my point: Kenny pointed to widespread allegations of voter fraud in last month's presidential election, a thriving drug trade in Helmand and Kandahar provinces and the recent passage of a law that allows for marital rape as signs that the mission in Afghanistan needs to be reevaluated.
Western Politicians seem to believe that with a bit of force and some promises of development will alter hundreds of years of tradition, tribalism and violence.
Economic Imperative:
The Americans made similar promises when Al Qaeda drove the Russians out of Afghanistan. Promises were not kept. Afghans ask 'what is different this time?' Afghan leaders are guilty of selling out to the highest bidder. Poppy crops are just about the only reliable crop in this drought stricken region and they have a ready market to sell into.
The United Nations estimates that half of Ghor's farmers don't earn enough to cover basic needs. So exhortations to plant alternatives seem doomed when a grower can make about $5,200 from an acre of opium but $121 from an acre of wheat.
Throughout Afghanistan, thousands who never grew opium began harvesting their crops in May, taught by experienced poppy farmers who have been traveling to new areas to share their skills.
Afghanistan regained its position as the largest opium country last year, producing 3,750 tons, and this year, production is expected to be as high, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. Seventy-five percent of the world's heroin, obtained from opium poppies, comes from Afghanistan.
Rensselaer Lee, an expert on the international drug trade, told the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that the control of drugs has taken a back seat to fighting terrorism, building consensus and strengthening alliances.
"To build these alliances, unfortunately, we've had to make some arrangements, compromises with people who, frankly, may have some history of involvement with the drug trade and may be even currently protecting the drug trade," said Lee, president of Global Advisory Services, a Virginia-based research group.
In early June, Karzai called for $20 billion in foreign aid, warning that without an economic boost, people would have to live on the opium trade.
Afghan Finance Minister Ghani Ahmadzai has also warned that without more international aid, Afghanistan could become reliant on the drug trade and crime - a problem that would be more expensive to fix than giving short-term aid.
Kenny, who is also Chairman of the Senate National Defence Security Committee, says his criticism may seem "offensive," but Canadians deserve to know what the government hopes to achieve in Afghanistan before the mission ends in 2011.
~Poppy Farmers
Violence in Afghanistan's volatile south has increased in recent weeks, particularly since a U.S. troop surge and a highly contentious presidential election... the increase in violence makes it clear that Canada's strategy to clear, hold and develop former Taliban strongholds is not working.
"Triple D: defence, diplomacy, development is not working. ...We don't have clear goals in Afghanistan. People are asking in my mail, 'Why doesn't the government tell us what they want to achieve there?'"
Retired Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie responded to Kenny's remarks by saying the increase in violence is in fact a sign that Canadian troops are doing valuable work in Afghanistan.
...the influx of American soldiers has allowed the Canadians to concentrate on a smaller area in their fight against the Taliban. Canada's strategy has been hampered by the fact that NATO failed "to provide the resources necessary to take this thing to a proper conclusion early on."
But Mackenzie said with the American surge and President Barack Obama's renewed focus on combating the Taliban in Afghanistan, the new commander of the International Security Assistance Force, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, will adopt Canada's clear, hold and develop strategy.
I say, there has been No Progress changing the character or mentality of Afghans:
Making my point: Kenny pointed to widespread allegations of voter fraud in last month's presidential election, a thriving drug trade in Helmand and Kandahar provinces and the recent passage of a law that allows for marital rape as signs that the mission in Afghanistan needs to be reevaluated.
Western Politicians seem to believe that with a bit of force and some promises of development will alter hundreds of years of tradition, tribalism and violence.
Economic Imperative:
The Americans made similar promises when Al Qaeda drove the Russians out of Afghanistan. Promises were not kept. Afghans ask 'what is different this time?' Afghan leaders are guilty of selling out to the highest bidder. Poppy crops are just about the only reliable crop in this drought stricken region and they have a ready market to sell into.
The United Nations estimates that half of Ghor's farmers don't earn enough to cover basic needs. So exhortations to plant alternatives seem doomed when a grower can make about $5,200 from an acre of opium but $121 from an acre of wheat.
Throughout Afghanistan, thousands who never grew opium began harvesting their crops in May, taught by experienced poppy farmers who have been traveling to new areas to share their skills.
Afghanistan regained its position as the largest opium country last year, producing 3,750 tons, and this year, production is expected to be as high, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. Seventy-five percent of the world's heroin, obtained from opium poppies, comes from Afghanistan.
Rensselaer Lee, an expert on the international drug trade, told the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that the control of drugs has taken a back seat to fighting terrorism, building consensus and strengthening alliances.
"To build these alliances, unfortunately, we've had to make some arrangements, compromises with people who, frankly, may have some history of involvement with the drug trade and may be even currently protecting the drug trade," said Lee, president of Global Advisory Services, a Virginia-based research group.
In early June, Karzai called for $20 billion in foreign aid, warning that without an economic boost, people would have to live on the opium trade.
Afghan Finance Minister Ghani Ahmadzai has also warned that without more international aid, Afghanistan could become reliant on the drug trade and crime - a problem that would be more expensive to fix than giving short-term aid.
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
From: bob lewis
Date: 11/5/2008 12:36:25 PM
To
Subject: Can't disagree with Freidman
"Incidentally, this was exactly what happened to the shah of Iran: 1) Sudden surge in oil prices. 2) Delusions of grandeur. 3) Sudden contraction of oil prices. 4) Dramatic downfall. 5) You’re toast.)"
"But the one thing Ahmadinejad couldn’t buy was real economic growth. Iran today has 30 percent inflation, 11 percent unemployment and huge underemployment with thousands of young college grads, engineers and architects selling pizzas and driving taxis. And now with oil prices falling, Iran — just like the Soviet Union — is going to have to pull back spending across the board. Fasten your seat belts."
"The U.N. Has imposed three rounds of sanctions against Iran since Ahmadinejad took office in 2005 because of Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment. But high oil prices minimized those sanctions; collapsing oil prices will now magnify those sanctions. If prices stay low, there is a good chance Iran will be open to negotiating over its nuclear program with the next U.S. President. "
OR START A WAR
"The other lesson from the carpet bazaar, says Sadjadpour, “is that there is never a price tag on any carpet. The dealer is not looking for a fixed price, but the highest price he can get — and the Iran price is constantly fluctuating depending on the price of oil.” Let’s now use that to our advantage."
Can you imagine the stock market without quoted prices or the housing market?
"Barack Hussein Obama would present another challenge for Iran’s mullahs. Their whole rationale for being is that they are resisting a hegemonic American power that wants to keep everyone down. Suddenly, next week, Iranians may look up and see that the country their leaders call “The Great Satan” has just elected “a guy whose middle name is the central figure in Shiite Islam — Hussein — and whose last name — Obama — when transliterated into Farsi, means ‘He is with us,’ ” said Sadjadpour."
"I’ve always been dubious about Barack Obama’s offer to negotiate with Iran — not because I didn’t believe that it was the right strategy, but because I didn’t believe we had enough leverage to succeed. And negotiating in the Middle East without leverage is like playing baseball without a bat."
This exercise just shows me how quotable Thom Freidman is when he writes these Op Ed's. He is planting virals which then can be spread across the wires and the Inrernet and quoted in other newspapers. It seems like much more than just making points in an essay.
Date: 11/5/2008 12:36:25 PM
To
Subject: Can't disagree with Freidman
"Incidentally, this was exactly what happened to the shah of Iran: 1) Sudden surge in oil prices. 2) Delusions of grandeur. 3) Sudden contraction of oil prices. 4) Dramatic downfall. 5) You’re toast.)"
"But the one thing Ahmadinejad couldn’t buy was real economic growth. Iran today has 30 percent inflation, 11 percent unemployment and huge underemployment with thousands of young college grads, engineers and architects selling pizzas and driving taxis. And now with oil prices falling, Iran — just like the Soviet Union — is going to have to pull back spending across the board. Fasten your seat belts."
"The U.N. Has imposed three rounds of sanctions against Iran since Ahmadinejad took office in 2005 because of Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment. But high oil prices minimized those sanctions; collapsing oil prices will now magnify those sanctions. If prices stay low, there is a good chance Iran will be open to negotiating over its nuclear program with the next U.S. President. "
OR START A WAR
"The other lesson from the carpet bazaar, says Sadjadpour, “is that there is never a price tag on any carpet. The dealer is not looking for a fixed price, but the highest price he can get — and the Iran price is constantly fluctuating depending on the price of oil.” Let’s now use that to our advantage."
Can you imagine the stock market without quoted prices or the housing market?
"Barack Hussein Obama would present another challenge for Iran’s mullahs. Their whole rationale for being is that they are resisting a hegemonic American power that wants to keep everyone down. Suddenly, next week, Iranians may look up and see that the country their leaders call “The Great Satan” has just elected “a guy whose middle name is the central figure in Shiite Islam — Hussein — and whose last name — Obama — when transliterated into Farsi, means ‘He is with us,’ ” said Sadjadpour."
"I’ve always been dubious about Barack Obama’s offer to negotiate with Iran — not because I didn’t believe that it was the right strategy, but because I didn’t believe we had enough leverage to succeed. And negotiating in the Middle East without leverage is like playing baseball without a bat."
This exercise just shows me how quotable Thom Freidman is when he writes these Op Ed's. He is planting virals which then can be spread across the wires and the Inrernet and quoted in other newspapers. It seems like much more than just making points in an essay.
van Gogh
One night I went for a walk by the sea along the empty shore. It was not gay, but neither was it sad – it was beautiful. The deep blue sky was flecked with clouds of a blue deeper than the fundamental blue of intense cobalt, and others of a clearer blue, like the blue whiteness of the Milky Way. In the blue depth the stars were sparkling, greenish, yellow, white, pink, more brilliant, more sparkling gemlike than at home – even in Paris: opals you might call them, emeralds, lapis luzuli, rubies, sapphires. The sea was very deep ultramarine – the shore a sort of violet and faint russet as I saw it, and on the dunes (they are about seventeen feet high) some bushes Prussian blue.
—Vincent van Gogh, in a letter to his brother Theo
—Vincent van Gogh, in a letter to his brother Theo
Sunday, November 23, 2008
Saturday, November 15, 2008
Monday, November 3, 2008
Afghanistan
Three bloody summers in Afghanistan
By Alastair Leithead
BBC News, Kabul
Three summers ago, Britain's war in Afghanistan began in earnest when 3,300 troops set up camp on a small, remote patch of desert in a little-known place called Helmand.
Some of the fiercest fighting has been in Helmand province
It's now a name most associate with war - a place where more than 100 British troops have died - and where efforts to bring stability and defeat a fierce insurgency have so far failed.
Some say there aren't enough troops, others say there are too many, and even commanders now admit this war won't be won by military force alone.
Based in Kabul, I have followed British troops over the last three years, and before leaving my posting in Afghanistan, went on one final trip to Helmand to try and answer the question of whether this mission is worthwhile.
In April 2006 it was sold, politically, as a peace-building mission.
"We'd be perfectly happy to leave in three years' time without firing one shot," the then Defence Secretary, John Reid, announced in Kabul.
But the following day the commander of British forces in Afghanistan, Brigadier Ed Butler gave another insight: "The greatest danger is we know very little about Helmand province, so it is a lack of information that will be the greatest challenge."
Just a few months later, troops were fighting for their lives, defending small isolated bases from wave after wave of attacks, dropping bombs on their doorsteps to keep insurgents at bay.
Since then, the nature of the fighting has changed, but the violence has continued.
2008 has been the bloodiest year yet for coalition troops
We experienced first hand the violence again this year - a third bloody summer for British forces in Helmand and at a forward base on the fringes of the town of Sangin.
We were met by incoming fire, as rockets crashed down close to the camp and British forces scrambled to return fire.
The next day, out on patrol, troops were dropping mortar bombs just ahead of their own positions as the Taleban moved forward into battle.
One mortar fell short through some technical fault and a soldier was injured, and the troops scrambled back to base with the insurgents in hot pursuit.
The next day they did it all over again, and on that occasion a 24-year-old dog handler was killed.
Since 2001 more than 120 British servicemen and women have died in Afghanistan.
Finding a way to win
The Taleban have lost many more men in the fighting, among them key commanders. They may wear flip-flops and fight a guerrilla war with old-fashioned weapons, but they are still a force capable of taking on the world's finest armies and not losing.
The definition of "winning" or "losing" is vitally important when it comes to what British and other international forces want to achieve in Afghanistan.
Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, who commanded British forces in Helmand this summer, told Panorama: "There is no exclusively military solution to the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan."
This power turbine will help provide electricity for more than a million
It's become clear over the months and years that this counter-insurgency campaign can't be won by fighting alone.
What then are the options for troops who are taking on a force prepared to die in battle, to blow themselves up in suicide attacks, and to plant roadside bombs in an effort to kill international and Afghan soldiers?
British forces came here to stop Afghanistan from again becoming the haven for al-Qaeda it was when the Twin Towers were hit on 9/11.
Troops are supporting the Afghan government, helping them to bring peace and prosperity and at the same time trying to tackle the huge problem of opium production, the raw material for most of the heroin on Britain's streets.
It has meant fighting to bring enough security to allow civilian experts to bring development projects to the people and better government to their town halls.
The strategy is to persuade Afghan people their lives will be better in a stable, secure, democratic Afghanistan.
This year more than £20m ($32m) will be spent on development projects in Helmand, including a river scheme which will bring irrigation water to 20,000 people and schools, clinics and wells.
However money has also been spent on a £300,000 road that, so far, goes nowhere, and a £400,000 park which few people use as security is so bad.
We met farmers and businessmen who laughed at the idea there was security in the towns and villages across much of Helmand.
People's opinions of the international efforts to help their country have changed over the past seven years.
In 2001 after the Taleban were forced from power, optimism was overflowing as first a new democratic constitution, then a president, then a parliament all took up office.
Millions of Afghans, living in exile after nearly 30 years of war, headed home with high hopes that finally their country was on track.
Millions of girls went to school, billions of dollars arrived in aid and the West felt confident it could change regimes and stabilise countries.
The battle for democracy
President Karzai questions Britain's tactics in Helmand
But this is Afghanistan: a fiercely tribal, staunchly Islamic, traditional society where warlords and drug barons, human rights abusers and criminals held sway amid the chaos and gained power as the Taleban fled.
Afghans were disappointed as the West failed to meet the expectations or bring the basics such as security and justice, but they now put up with the foreign involvement knowing it would be civil war if they left.
The Afghan government is struggling to keep a hold as the situation is gradually deteriorating.
President Hamid Karzai believes the British in Helmand have taken the wrong approach.
"The problem in the West was they felt they could copy in a day a system of administration and management which has been practiced in your country for more than a century," he told Panorama.
The troop presence continues and more US forces will soon be deployed to Afghanistan, an important and strategic country wedged between Iran and an increasingly chaotic Pakistan.
Can the multinational forces "win" in Afghanistan? Only if winning means staying and not "losing" long enough for Afghanistan to shape a stable future.
However, with the insurgency filtering
By Alastair Leithead
BBC News, Kabul
Three summers ago, Britain's war in Afghanistan began in earnest when 3,300 troops set up camp on a small, remote patch of desert in a little-known place called Helmand.
Some of the fiercest fighting has been in Helmand province
It's now a name most associate with war - a place where more than 100 British troops have died - and where efforts to bring stability and defeat a fierce insurgency have so far failed.
Some say there aren't enough troops, others say there are too many, and even commanders now admit this war won't be won by military force alone.
Based in Kabul, I have followed British troops over the last three years, and before leaving my posting in Afghanistan, went on one final trip to Helmand to try and answer the question of whether this mission is worthwhile.
In April 2006 it was sold, politically, as a peace-building mission.
"We'd be perfectly happy to leave in three years' time without firing one shot," the then Defence Secretary, John Reid, announced in Kabul.
But the following day the commander of British forces in Afghanistan, Brigadier Ed Butler gave another insight: "The greatest danger is we know very little about Helmand province, so it is a lack of information that will be the greatest challenge."
Just a few months later, troops were fighting for their lives, defending small isolated bases from wave after wave of attacks, dropping bombs on their doorsteps to keep insurgents at bay.
Since then, the nature of the fighting has changed, but the violence has continued.
2008 has been the bloodiest year yet for coalition troops
We experienced first hand the violence again this year - a third bloody summer for British forces in Helmand and at a forward base on the fringes of the town of Sangin.
We were met by incoming fire, as rockets crashed down close to the camp and British forces scrambled to return fire.
The next day, out on patrol, troops were dropping mortar bombs just ahead of their own positions as the Taleban moved forward into battle.
One mortar fell short through some technical fault and a soldier was injured, and the troops scrambled back to base with the insurgents in hot pursuit.
The next day they did it all over again, and on that occasion a 24-year-old dog handler was killed.
Since 2001 more than 120 British servicemen and women have died in Afghanistan.
Finding a way to win
The Taleban have lost many more men in the fighting, among them key commanders. They may wear flip-flops and fight a guerrilla war with old-fashioned weapons, but they are still a force capable of taking on the world's finest armies and not losing.
The definition of "winning" or "losing" is vitally important when it comes to what British and other international forces want to achieve in Afghanistan.
Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, who commanded British forces in Helmand this summer, told Panorama: "There is no exclusively military solution to the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan."
This power turbine will help provide electricity for more than a million
It's become clear over the months and years that this counter-insurgency campaign can't be won by fighting alone.
What then are the options for troops who are taking on a force prepared to die in battle, to blow themselves up in suicide attacks, and to plant roadside bombs in an effort to kill international and Afghan soldiers?
British forces came here to stop Afghanistan from again becoming the haven for al-Qaeda it was when the Twin Towers were hit on 9/11.
Troops are supporting the Afghan government, helping them to bring peace and prosperity and at the same time trying to tackle the huge problem of opium production, the raw material for most of the heroin on Britain's streets.
It has meant fighting to bring enough security to allow civilian experts to bring development projects to the people and better government to their town halls.
The strategy is to persuade Afghan people their lives will be better in a stable, secure, democratic Afghanistan.
This year more than £20m ($32m) will be spent on development projects in Helmand, including a river scheme which will bring irrigation water to 20,000 people and schools, clinics and wells.
However money has also been spent on a £300,000 road that, so far, goes nowhere, and a £400,000 park which few people use as security is so bad.
We met farmers and businessmen who laughed at the idea there was security in the towns and villages across much of Helmand.
People's opinions of the international efforts to help their country have changed over the past seven years.
In 2001 after the Taleban were forced from power, optimism was overflowing as first a new democratic constitution, then a president, then a parliament all took up office.
Millions of Afghans, living in exile after nearly 30 years of war, headed home with high hopes that finally their country was on track.
Millions of girls went to school, billions of dollars arrived in aid and the West felt confident it could change regimes and stabilise countries.
The battle for democracy
President Karzai questions Britain's tactics in Helmand
But this is Afghanistan: a fiercely tribal, staunchly Islamic, traditional society where warlords and drug barons, human rights abusers and criminals held sway amid the chaos and gained power as the Taleban fled.
Afghans were disappointed as the West failed to meet the expectations or bring the basics such as security and justice, but they now put up with the foreign involvement knowing it would be civil war if they left.
The Afghan government is struggling to keep a hold as the situation is gradually deteriorating.
President Hamid Karzai believes the British in Helmand have taken the wrong approach.
"The problem in the West was they felt they could copy in a day a system of administration and management which has been practiced in your country for more than a century," he told Panorama.
The troop presence continues and more US forces will soon be deployed to Afghanistan, an important and strategic country wedged between Iran and an increasingly chaotic Pakistan.
Can the multinational forces "win" in Afghanistan? Only if winning means staying and not "losing" long enough for Afghanistan to shape a stable future.
However, with the insurgency filtering
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